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Saturation Foot-Patrol in a High-Violence
Area: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation
Eric L. Piza and Brian A. O’Hara
This study incorporates a quasi-experimental design to evaluate a saturation
foot-patrol initiative in Newark, NJ. Violent crime was measured for one year
prior and during the initiative within the target area, a surrounding catchment
area, and two separate control areas. The overall findings provide further sup-
port for foot-patrol as a crime prevention tactic. Total street violence as well
as the disaggregate categories of murder, shootings, and nondomestic aggra-
vated assault decreased within the target area absent of any displacement
effects. However, robbery suffered from substantial levels of both temporal
and spatial displacement, showing saturation foot-patrol to have varying
impact on different types of street violence. This finding suggests that police
should design large-scale foot-patrol initiatives in a manner that does not
allow offenders, particularly robbers, to easily gauge the scope of the inter-
vention and identify alternate crime opportunities.
Keywords foot patrol; GIS; displacement; police crackdowns; place-based
policing
Introduction
This paper reports the findings from an evaluation of Operation Impact, a satu-
ration foot-patrol initiative in Newark, NJ. On a nightly basis, 12 officers under
the supervision of three supervisors patrolled a quarter-square-mile area of
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the city. With Newark’s police sectors——averaging approximately 32 miles in
size——being typically patrolled by two officers, Operation Impact represented
a drastic increase in police presence within the target area. The intervention
was informed by the extensive crime-and-place literature as well as the strate-
gic philosophy of the Newark Police leadership. Foot-patrols were deployed as
a deterrence mechanism through which potential offenders would identify an
increased risk of apprehension, a common goal of place-based policing (see
Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood (2011) for a recent example). Further-
more, proactive enforcement actions enacted by the officers were expected to
disrupt street-level disorder and narcotics activity in areas prone to violence,
a tactic the Newark Police leadership considered to be effective based on their
professional experience.
This study contributes to the place-based policing literature both for the
overall success and specific limitations of the intervention. Whereas prior
research has found foot-patrol to have little effect on crime, this paper pro-
vides a case study of how foot-patrol can generate reductions in serious vio-
lence. Findings relative to robbery, however, imply that police officials should
design large-scale foot-patrol operations in a manner that minimizes potential
offenders’ ability to identify alternate crime opportunities. While “displace-
ment doomsters” (Clarke & Eck, 2005, step 12) have wrongly considered situa-
tional efforts to unequivocally “shift” rather than “prevent” crime, this study
warns that displacement remains a very real threat to geographically focused
police operations.
Review of Relevant Literature
Place-Based Policing
There is much empirical support for the “crime and place” perspective (Braga
& Weisburd, 2010; Eck & Weisburd, 1995). The seminal work of the Chicago
School (Burgess, 1928; Park, 1936; Shaw & McKay, 1942) demonstrated the
environmental composition of neighborhoods to be more closely associated
with high crime rates than resident demographics over three-plus decades in
Chicago. With time, and technological advancements, scholars examined crime
concentration within micro-environments, such as street segments, block
faces, and addresses, further illustrating the influence of place-level factors
on crime. Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) found that 3% of addresses
accounted for over 50% of calls for service in Minneapolis over a one-year per-
iod. Subsequent evaluations have produced similar findings, with significant
clustering being observed in respect to gun violence (Braga, Papachristos, &
Hureau, 2010; Ratcliffe & Rengert, 2008; Wells, Wu, & Ye, 2011), robbery
(Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, 2011), burglary (Farrell & Pease, 1993; John-
son & Bowers, 2004), and drug dealing (Weisburd et al., 2006; Weisburd &
Green, 1995).







































Hot spots have also shown to persist over rather extensive time periods.
Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang (2004) found that for every year over a 14-
year period approximately 5% of Seattle’s street segments accounted for
roughly 50% of the city’s reported crime incidents. Similar concentration was
found when observations were restricted to juvenile crime; just 86 of Seattle’s
street segments accounted for one-third of crime incidents in which a juvenile
was arrested during the 14-year study period (Weisburd, Morris, & Groff,
2009). Replications of the Seattle research, which incorporated street intersec-
tions along with street segments as units of analysis, found firearm assaults
(Braga et al., 2010) and robbery (Braga et al., 2011) to be similarly confined to
few places in Boston over a 29-year period.
The clustering of crime is explained by opportunity-based theories of
criminology. Routine activities considers crime as the result of the spatial and
temporal convergence of a motivated offender and likely target in the absence
of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). This convergence typically occurs
as a result of everyday patterns of activity across the life course. For example,
the rise of residential burglary between the 1960s and 1970s was explained by a
change in the routine activities of American households. Due to the increased
numbers of single-headed households and women in the workforce homes were
left empty and unguarded more often than had previously been the case (Cohen
& Felson, 1979). Micro-level crime patterns are similarly influenced by the activ-
ity of victims and offenders. For example, Wiebe, Anderson, Richmond, Nance,
and Branas (2010) found that juvenile gun assault victims in Philadelphia were
often victimized during the course of their daily travel patterns. Crime pattern
theory adds further perspective. Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) illustrate
that offenders discover crime opportunities primarily through their daily travels
between home, work, and recreation. Crime commonly occurs around these
nodes and the paths traveled between them for reasons of convenience; it is
easier to commit crime during the course of daily activity than by making a spe-
cial journey to do so (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Ratcliffe (2006) argued that the
temporal constraints of daily life contribute to the clustering of crime within
the confines of an offender’s activity space. The presence of hot-spot places,
particularly crime “generators” and “attractors,” additionally influence micro-
level crime concentrations (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995). The crimino-
genic influence of crime generators and attractors is well-established. Recently,
Bernasco and Block (2011) found that each of the 14 types of crime generators
and attractors included in their analysis were associated with increased numbers
of robberies within census blocks in Chicago.
The high concentration of crime suggests that focusing efforts at specific
places can yield greater gains than the even deployment of personnel through-
out a jurisdiction. Indeed, the Minneapolis hot-spots policing experiment (Sher-
man & Weisburd, 1995) demonstrated the concentration of police patrol within
high-crime places to be a more effective strategy than the standard patrol
model explored in the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate,








































porary policing, with crime control tactics commonly directing resources
towards high crime places (Weisburd, 2008). Reviews of police practices find
geographically focused strategies to have strong evidence of effectiveness
(Braga, 2008; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004) with later occurring
randomized, controlled trials providing further support (Braga & Bond, 2008;
Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011).
Foot-Patrol
As a law enforcement strategy, foot-patrol has been considered both archaic
and innovative throughout history. Leaders of the “Professional Era” of American
policing considered foot-patrol to be an inefficient use of personnel and pro-
moted the use of motorized patrol. Proponents cited several advantages; auto-
mobiles increased the range of patrol officers, enabled officers to quickly
respond to incidents, and enabled police to keep pace with criminals who
increasingly utilized cars to commit crime (Wilson, 1963). Concurrent improve-
ments in communications technology, specifically telephones and two-way
radios, entrenched “rapid response” and preventive patrol via automobiles as
the primary function of American police (Kelling & Coles, 1996).
With time, the effectiveness of these strategies would be called into ques-
tion. A series of studies suggested that preventative patrol (Kelling et al.,
1974) and rapid response (Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, 1977;
Spelman & Brown, 1981) had limited impact on crime. Furthermore, many
scholars argued that deploying officers in cars unintentionally damaged police-
community relations, with residents viewing police as an occupying force who
entered neighborhoods strictly for the purpose of enforcing the law (Kelling &
Coles, 1996). This was exacerbated with the increase in typical police beat
size, made possible by patrol cars, which spread police thinly across a jurisdic-
tion and minimized opportunities for police-citizen contact (Esbensen, 1987).
The community-policing movement regarded foot-patrol as a remedy to
these dilemmas, citing that the deployment of foot-patrol officers produced a
sense of familiarity and trust amongst police and residents (Kelling & Coles,
1996). Scholars have argued that citizens consider officers on foot to be more
approachable and are more likely to consider police as being “there for the
neighborhood” when they are observed on walking posts rather than in patrol
cars (Cordner, 2010, p. 46). From a law enforcement perspective, this increase
in police-citizen familiarly can improve face-to-face communication and culmi-
nate in the exchange of important information needed to prevent and solve
crime (Trojanowicz, 1984). Early studies lent support to foot-patrol as a com-
munity-policing strategy. The Newark Foot-Patrol Experiment found police
beats with heightened levels of foot-patrol to have experienced significant
improvements in community fear of crime (Kelling, 1981). Similar fear reduc-
tions were generated by foot-patrol in Flint (Trojanowicz, 1982) and Baltimore
(Cordner, 1986).







































Evidence of foot-patrol’s crime prevention capability is less convincing.
While the Flint program found an 8% crime decrease in experimental areas
compared to a city-wide increase, most studies found foot-patrol’s crime pre-
vention utility to be negligible. The Newark Foot-patrol Experiment found little
effect on crime. A reallocation of Boston’s patrol officers, which reassigned
34% of the force to foot-patrol, failed to produce significant crime control or
order maintenance benefits (Bowers & Hirsch, 1987). Similarly, Esbensen
(1987) as well as Esbensen and Taylor (1984) found little support for foot-
patrol as a crime-prevention tool.
The cumulative research led the National Research Council to classify foot-
patrol as an approach with “weak to moderate” evidence of effectiveness
(Skogan & Frydl, 2004). However, recent evaluations suggest that focused
foot-patrol may produce crime prevention benefits in certain contexts. Jones
and Tilley (2004) found foot-patrol in a British city center to have reduced rob-
bery compared to a regional and national increase. Furthermore, a random-
ized, controlled experiment in Philadelphia found foot-patrol to have produced
a statistically significant 23% reduction in violent street crime within 60 experi-
mental hot spots relative to the control group (Ratcliffe et al., 2011).
Displacement
The potential occurrence of displacement is a long-standing criticism of crime-
prevention efforts. Support for the displacement perspective was first articu-
lated by Reppetto (1976) who argued that the offender’s natural response to
prevention is the adjustment of his/her criminal activity in order to evade the
intervention. The literature has identified six specific forms of displacement:
spatial, temporal, target, tactical, perpetrator, and crime type (Barr & Pease,
1990). Spatial displacement poses a particular threat to place-based placing
and is the most common form of displacement measured in evaluations of
crime-prevention efforts (Guerette & Bowers, 2009; Hessling, 1994).
The universal acceptance of displacement generated from early criminologi-
cal theories, which considered the impetus for crime commission to be forces
outside of the individual. Under this point of view, social ills such as unemploy-
ment, poverty, and inequality make displacement inevitable; a person’s choice
to offend is predetermined due to society’s inherent flaws (Eck, 1993). The
rise of “opportunity-based” theories, particularly Rational Choice (Cornish &
Clark, 1986), brought about a change in perspective. Under this conceptual
framework, displacement is not an automatic result of crime prevention. Since
criminal opportunities are not equally spread across time and space, the block-
ing of one specific crime opportunity does not automatically create another
(Felson & Clarke, 1998). Furthermore, offenders may lack the requisite skill
set to commit alternate offenses. A drug dealer, for example, may not be
readily able to commit robbery and may be more likely to desist from crime








































Clarke, 1987). Given the purposive nature of offending, criminals will decide
whether or not to seek alternate targets based on “choice structuring proper-
ties” relative to their personal motivations (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). In a par-
ticularly profound example, suicide by household gas in Britain was virtually
eliminated through the introduction of natural gas and was not followed by dis-
placement to other suicide tactics (Clarke & Mayhew, 1988). While suicide is
not normally associated with crime prevention, this finding had significant
implications for displacement. As noted by Barr and Pease (1990, p. 284),
Killing oneself is a major decision. Burglary (say) is less so. If the decision to
kill oneself is reversed by the in-availability of toxic gas, then the decision
to commit burglaries should be even less robust in the face of obstacles.
Research has shown that successful interventions most often do not result in
displacement, but when they do, the amount of crime displaced is substan-
tially less than the amount of crime prevented (Barr & Pease, 1990; Eck, 1993;
Guerette & Bowers, 2009; Hessling, 1994). At the same time, support exists for
diffusion of crime control benefits——the reduction of crimes not directly tar-
geted by the preventive action (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994). Guerette and Bow-
ers (2009) found that in 574 observations, diffusion of benefits occurred in 27%
of cases with displacement being observed in 26%, suggesting diffusion of ben-
efits to be about as likely as displacement to occur following a successful
crime-prevention effort. For the majority of cases, no displacement or diffu-
sion was observed, mirroring findings of previous reviews (Barr & Pease, 1990;
Eck, 1993; Hessling, 1994).
Scope of the Current Research: Policing “Places” in Newark, NJ
Newark is the largest city in New Jersey, spanning over 262 miles with a popu-
lation of nearly 280,000 persons, an estimated 11,494 persons per square mile,
compared to 1,134 statewide (US Census Bureau, 2012). The city has a long-
standing reputation as a tumultuous, dangerous urban environment (Tuttle,
2009), and has particularly struggled with issues of gun violence. Internal
police department data indicates that over 84% of murders occurred as a result
of a gunshot wound from 2007 through 2010, while roughly half of all robberies
involved a firearm. Newark officials consider a great deal of violence to
revolve around the illicit narcotics trade. In addition, disorderly situations are
considered common contributors to violence. A drunken quarrel may lead to a
homicide if a firearm is readily available and a street-corner dice game can
provide an adequate target for gun-toting robbers.
In mid-2006, the Newark Police Department underwent a significant change in
its overall strategy and mission with the appointment of a new regime. Along
with the restructuring of the agency to better provide coverage on nighttime
and weekend shifts, the agency committed to a place-based approach in its
crime-prevention efforts. Proactive enforcement aimed at street-level disorder







































and the illicit narcotics trade became the primary strategy against violence. In
June 2008, the Newark Police Department launched Operation Impact, an initia-
tive that epitomized the agency’s place-based strategy. On a nightly basis, 12
police officers under the direction of two sergeants and one lieutenant patrolled
the target area on foot. The officers and supervisors comprised a special unit
dedicated to exclusively patrolling the target area. A select group of officers
were assigned to Operation Impact upon graduation from the police academy
and remained detailed to the intervention until graduates from the ensuing
academy class were selected as their successors. Supervisors were selected
based on their levels of experience managing proactive enforcement units, such
as “Gangs” or “Narcotics.” The design and enforcement strategy of Operation
Impact has its roots in a New York Police Department (NYPD) strategy of the
same name. In their analysis of the NYPD strategy, Smith and Purtell (2007)
found that precincts assigned Impact zones in 2003 “experienced a 24% accelera-
tion in declining murder rates, a more than doubling of the rate of decline in
rape . . . a 21% boost in the decline of robbery rate and of 23% in assault rate by
2006” compared to the rest of the city (p. 9).
Despite these positive findings, the research design raises some questions,
particularly regarding the use of precincts as units of analysis. Given the influ-
ence of spatial aggregation on the validity and reliability of place-based evalua-
tions (Weisburd, Morris, & Ready, 2008), the designation of precincts as units of
analysis may not accurately measure the effect of police efforts at specific
places. While the NYPD implemented Operation Impact in areas most in need of
intervention, it is reasonable to believe that certain places not chosen as
Impact Zones also experienced high levels of crime. Police Commanders most
likely devised strategies and dedicated resources towards these high-crime
locales in their precincts. In fact, NYPD officials considered a main benefit of
Operation Impact to be that officers assigned to precincts with Impact Zones
were “freed up” to address crime problems in other areas of the precinct
(Golden & Almo, 2004, p. 10). It is reasonable to believe that police activity
outside of the Impact Zones may have contributed to the precinct-wide crime
reductions, making the precinct-wide crime declines more reflective of the
effect of cumulative police efforts rather than just Operation Impact. Further-
more, a test of geographic displacement and diffusion of benefits in not feasi-
ble with aggregate units of analysis. The current evaluation builds upon the
approach of Smith and Purtell (2007) by specifying target, catchment, and con-
trol areas within a Geographic Information System (GIS), allowing for the explo-
ration of research questions more directly related to the intervention at hand.
Research Methods and Data
Target Area Description
An in-depth analysis of the spatial distribution of street violence was con-








































nonfatal shootings, aggravated assault, and robbery occurring over the 36
month period from 1 January 2005 through 31 December 2007.1 Incidents were
weighted based on their seriousness and the recency of their occurrence.2 This
method allows more recent events to have particular relevance in the creation
of target areas while accounting for the long-term crime trend. Ratcliffe et al.
(2011) utilized a similar temporal weighting approach in their selection of vio-
lent crime hot spots in Philadelphia.
The target area sits within Newark’s Fourth Precinct. The thoroughfare of
South Orange Avenue stretches east to west through the center of the zone.
Apartment buildings and assorted business types (e.g. liquor establishments,
take-out eateries, and retail establishments) line this main corridor as well as
many of the intersecting streets. The eastern portion of the zone contains a
large housing complex, New Community Homes, known to be a high-violence
drug trafficking area. The complex is comprised of 28 low-rise buildings situated
in a perpendicular fashion.3 This layout creates a “maze-like” network of streets
and walkways more easily navigated by occupying drug crews than responding
officers, which the Newark Police cited as an impediment to previous efforts to
disrupt drug trafficking and related violence in and around the complex.
Data Sources and Analytical Design
Data for this evaluation was compiled from the Newark Police Department’s
GIS. Crime incidents from 4 June 2007 through 3 June 2008 comprised the one-
year pre-implementation period with 4 June 2008 through 3 June 2009 com-
prising the one-year implementation period.4 While Operation Impact lasted
approximately two years, severe cuts in the department’s budget and person-
nel caused a steady decline in the scope and dosage of the initiative beginning
in the third quarter of 2009. The one-year period represents the time when
Operation Impact ran at full strength and is thus the most appropriate study
period.
To measure the effect of the intervention, crime incidents were measured
within four areas: the target area, a surrounding catchment area, and two dif-
ferent control areas. An area extending approximately one block in each direc-
tion from the target area serves as the catchment area. According to Bowers
and Johnson (2003), there exists a “displacement gradient” in respect to
1. To better tailor the analysis to the planned strategy, domestic violence incidents occurring
indoors as well as fights between students on school property were excluded due to such behavior
not being the focus of the intervention.
2. Given limited space, this paper does not discuss the target-area selection process in detail. A
report outlining the analysis is available from the primary author upon request.
3. The number of buildings were ascertained through a visual count conducted using aerial imagery
from Google Maps (www.maps.google.com).
4. Similar to the target area selection analysis, incidents not likely to be influenced by the inter-
vention strategy (domestic assaults occurring indoors and student fights on school property) were
excluded from the study.







































place-based interventions; as the distance from the treatment area increases
the likelihood of spatial displacement decreases. The size of the catchment
area was thus minimized to reflect the area where offenders would most likely
travel in response to blocked crime opportunities in the target area. The one-
block parameter was also chosen in an effort to reflect the layout of the target
area, which extended a block north and south from South Orange Avenue on
its western portion and from 14th avenue on its eastern portion. The catch-
ment area was extended in certain directions to include places the Newark
Police believed offenders may relocate to. For example, the area to the south-
east contains a low-rise complex police felt provided similar opportunities for
crime as the New Community complex. The south-eastern portion of the catch-
ment area was thus extended one block to account for this area. Conversely,
the area to the immediate north west of the target area was excluded due to
it being a large cemetery.
Observed crime changes in the target area were compared with two sepa-
rate control areas. The first was the Fourth Precinct minus the target area and
surrounding catchment area. This control contains areas unrelated to Opera-
tion Impact primarily policed through “standard” law enforcement methods,
such as routine patrol, retrospective investigations, and ad hoc narcotics oper-
ations. “Zone B,” a prospective target area identified during the target selec-
tion stage, was selected as the second control area for two reasons. First, it
exhibited the second highest violent crime total of the five prospective target
areas, making its violent crime problem comparable to that of the Operation
Impact grid. Secondly, the geographic layout of Zone B is similar to that of the
target area. Large, high-rise apartment buildings line two streets that run
north to south through the middle of the zone with a number of commercial
establishments appearing on main thoroughfares forming the boundary of the
area. These characteristics make Zone B an appropriate near-equivalent
comparison for the target area (see Figure 1).
The precinct commander responsible for Zone B designated it a “Narcotic
Hot-Spot Zone,” mandating motorized patrol officers and plain clothes detec-
tives to enact proactive enforcement actions in the area. While Zone B’s
place-based strategy is somewhat similar to that of Operation Impact, the ini-
tiatives differ vastly in respect to posture and dosage. Operation Impact
deployed 12 officers and three supervisors within the quarter-mile target area
on a nightly basis. Place-based enforcement did not occur as rigorously within
Zone B, with focused patrol and street-level narcotics operations occurring on
an intermittent basis. The patrol officers assigned to Zone B’s encompassing
sector remained the only officers with daily responsibilities in the area.
Separate controls were incorporated to provide added perspective to any
observed crime changes in the target area. Operation Impact’s intensive foot-
patrol approach is compared with tactics specific to the two control areas:
intermittent, place-based enforcement in Zone B and “standard” responses to
crime in the precinct. Any reductions would need to outperform both control








































Figure 1 Target, catchment, and the “Zone B” control area.








































The effect of the intervention is reported as an odds ratio (OR). As described
by Welsh and Farrington (2009, p. 135), the OR indicates the “proportional
change in crime in the control area compared with the experimental area.”
The OR is calculated via the following formula:
OR=(a d)/(b c)
with a, b, c, and d designated as follows:5
Pre-intervention crime count During-intervention crime count
Target area a b
Control area c d
The obtained value represents the strength and direction of the program
impact. An OR > 1 indicates a desirable effect on crime in the target area rela-
tive to the control while an OR < 1 indicates an undesirable effect. An OR of
1.3, for example, shows that crime increased 30% in the control area relative
to the target area.6 The statistical significance of each OR was measured
through its variance (VOR) and associated 95% confidence interval, which were
calculated using the Effect Size Calculator developed by David B. Wilson, avail-
able on the Campbell Collaboration website.7
ORs were computed for five different outcome measures: overall violence,
and the disaggregate categories of murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and
shootings. Two OR values were computed for each crime category: one relative
to the precinct control area and another relative to Zone B. Efforts were also
taken to measure any potential displacement or diffusion of benefits effects.
Since the foot-patrol officers were deployed during a fixed 8-h time span
within the same area on a nightly basis, both spatial and temporal displace-
ment were measured. Temporal displacement was measured through two addi-
tional sets of OR, showing crime level changes during the operational hours
between 6 pm and 2 am and the nonoperational hours comprising the remain-
der of the day. A crime reduction during operational hours coupled with an
increase during nonoperational times suggests the presence of temporal dis-
placement. All crime types with a positive, statistically significant OR (which
suggests a crime reduction) were included in a subsequent test of spatial dis-
placement.8 A Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ)9 was calculated for
5. Chart adapted from Welsh and Farrington (2009, p. 135).
6. The inverse of the OR displays the crime difference within the target area. An OR of 1.3 implies
that target area crime reduced 23% relative to the control since the inverted value of the OR (1/
1.3) is 0.77 (Welsh & Farrington, 2009, p. 135).
7. http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/resources/effect_size_input.php.
8. Since displacement and diffusion of benefits are seen as responses to successful prevention
efforts, it makes little sense to look for evidence of such in the absence of achieved crime reduc-
tions (Clarke & Eck, 2005, step 51).
9. The formula is as follows: WDQ=([Da/Ca][Db/Cb])/([Ra/Ca][Rb/Cb]) where D, R, and C repre-
sent the displacement, response, and control areas, respectively, and “b” and “a” indicate the








































each such observation using the WDQ Calculator developed by Ratcliffe and
Breen (2008). The WDQ is a statistic that compares changes in the target area
to those in the control and buffer zones (Bowers & Johnson, 2003) with nega-
tive values showing evidence of displacement and positive values implying a
diffusion of crime-control benefits.
Findings
Officer Enforcement Activity
Before discussing the intervention’s effect of crime, it is useful to explore the
enforcement activity of the foot-patrol officers. Sherman and Eck (2002)
argued that evaluations of crime-prevention programs should aim to measure
“exactly what police do——and when they do it” because it allows researchers
to “tell the difference between programs that ‘do not work,’ and programs
that simply ‘did not happen’” (Sherman & Eck, 2002, p. 302). In regard to suc-
cessful interventions, measures of enforcement activity can add perspective as
to how program effects were achieved. Table 1 displays the overall enforce-
ment actions enacted by Operation Impact.10 In total, the unit enacted 3,186
enforcement actions: 634 arrests, 1,202 quality of life summonses (QOL), and
1,350 field interrogations (FIs). This averages to more than eight enforcement
actions per 8-h tour of duty, with each of the officers averaging approximately
one arrest, nearly three QOL summonses, and nearly four FIs per week: a
somewhat modest total given the level of crime observed in the target area.
Figure 2 displays the linear trend of the arrests, QOL summonses, and FIs,
all of which trended downward over the study period. There are different pos-
sible explanations for this decline. For one, a “crackdown decay” may have
occurred, where the intervention experienced a “bureaucratic regression to
the mean level of effort” (Sherman, 1990, p. 10) resulting in fewer enforce-
ment activities by the officers. Conversely, enforcement activity occurring at
the outset of the intervention may have reduced the amount of street-level
criminal behavior, such as narcotics activity or disorderly behavior, resulting in
fewer crimes for officers to take enforcement actions against. Officer pres-
ence, rather than enforcement, may have become the primary prevention
mechanism over time.
Unfortunately, the lack of specific data prevents the formulation (and vali-
dation) of specific hypotheses regarding the effect of the enforcement activ-
ity. Knowing what the arrests and summonses were for, as well as the results
of FIs, would have allowed for much greater interpretation. Evaluation of the
intervention occurred “post hoc,” which prevented an in-depth analysis of the
officer activity. Therefore, the precise nature and scope of the enforcement
10. The enforcement data were collected from daily Operation Impact after-action reports, which
capture the number of enforcement actions enacted during the previous night’s tour of duty.







































activity are unknown. The evaluation would have benefitted from researchers
being directly involved during the beginning stages of the intervention, when
more rigorous measurement and observation of enforcement activities would
have been possible.11
Program Effect on Violence
Operation Impact outperformed the precinct control area on all crime
measures. Table 2 displays the Odds Ratios for each of the crime types
included in the analysis. The OR for overall violence was 1.73, showing a
reduction of 42% relative to the surrounding precinct. OR values for the disag-
gregate crime categories provide further support for the intervention. Shoot-
ings (2.61), aggravated assault (2.94), and murder (2.57) each decreased over
60% relative to the precinct. The murder reduction was not statistically signifi-
cant, which was more likely due to murders occurring too infrequently to
achieve statistical power than any inadequacy of the intervention (Eck, 2002,
p. 284). In the case of robbery, however, the lack of statistical significance is
a reflection of the crime being minimally influenced by the intervention. While
the OR of 1.13 suggests a crime reduction, the pre-intervention, and during-
intervention robbery counts (47 incidents) were identical.
Figure 2 Linear trend lines of Operation Impact arrests, QOL summonses, and FIs.
11. Numerous scholars have advocated for a higher level of integration between police practitio-
ners and researchers (see Braga (2010) for example).
Table 1 Enforcement actions of the Operation Impact officers
Enforcement actions Count Per day Per officer, per day Per officer, per week
Arrests 634 1.74 0.15 1.05
QOL summonses 1202 3.29 0.27 1.89
FIs 1350 3.70 0.31 3.72








































Operation Impact sustains its positive effect when compared to the Zone B
control area, albeit to a lesser extent. The program achieved a statistically sig-
nificant OR of 1.58 for overall violence and a statistically significant OR of 2.51
for aggravated assault, reflecting a decrease of 30 and 61%, respectively.
Although shootings’ OR of 1.62 did not reach statistical significance, the
change within the target area (from 22 to 13) compares favorably to that of
Zone B (from 24 to 22). Similar to the precinct comparison, murder’s OR (5.25)
was not statistically significant and robbery failed to show an improvement.
While the intervention compared favorably to both of the controls, OR val-
ues for each crime category except murder were higher when the precinct
served as the control area. This concurs with the previous literature. The
place-based tactics utilized in Zone B have more evidence of effectiveness
than the “standard” police practices primarily utilized in the precinct (Skogan
& Frydl, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). In addition, as a nonequivalent control
area (which is much larger than the target area),12 the precinct control repre-
sents a weaker evaluative design than the near-equivalent Zone B. Prior
research has demonstrated that weaker designs are more likely to report stron-
ger effect sizes (Weisburd, Lum, & Petrosino, 2001; Welsh, Peel, Farrington,
Elffers, & Braga, 2011).
Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits
To gauge the presence of temporal displacement, crime levels were measured
for the operational hours between 6 pm and 2 am and the nonoperational
hours comprising the reminder of the day (see Table 3). All crime types
decreased during the operational hours. Reductions were sustained during the
Table 2 Target area ORs by crime type











Murder 2.57 0.94 0.72 0.49-13.57 5.25 1.66 1.06 0.70-39.48
Robbery 1.13 0.12 0.12 0.72-1.75 1.03 0.03 0.11 0.55-1.95
Aggravated
assault
2.94⁄ 1.08 0.07 1.74-4.98 2.51⁄ 0.92 0.11 1.31-4.81
overall
violence
1.73⁄ 0.55 0.03 1.25-2.38 1.58⁄ 0.46 0.05 1.02-2.42
Shootings 2.61⁄ 0.96 0.15 1.23-5.52 1.62 0.48 0.21 0.66-3.96
⁄p <.05.
12. This issue is discussed further in the “Policy Implications and Conclusion” section.







































nonoperational time period for four of the five crime categories, the lone
exception being robbery, which increased over 73% from 15 to 26 incidents.
While the control areas also experienced robbery increases during the nonoper-
ational hours, the target area’s nonoperational robbery increase is substan-
tially larger than the precinct’s and more than doubles Zone B’s.
The presence of temporal displacement is further highlighted by the ORs
(see Table 4). In respect to both control areas, OR’s were above one for rob-
bery during operational hours and below one during the remainder of the day
(though neither observation was statistically significant). These figures suggest
that the robbery reduction achieved while the foot-patrol officers were within
the target area may have been negated by off-hour crime increases. This
observation was unique to robberies, with all other crime types decreasing dur-
ing both operational and nonoperational hours in the target area (see Table 5).
The test of spatial displacement included all crime categories with positive,
statistically significant ORs to ensure reduction effects strong enough for dis-
placement or diffusion of benefits to be reasonably possible. In all, twelve
observations across the three time periods fit this criterion (see Table 5). Five
occurred over the 24 h period, four during the operational hours, and three
during the nonoperational hours. Each observation was of one of the following
categories: overall violence (five), aggravated assault (five), or shootings
(two).
Of the 12 observations, only the two relative to shootings exhibited positive,
but small, WDQ’s suggestive of a modest diffusion of benefits effect. The WDQ
was zero for aggravated assault relative to the precinct during operational
hours, showing neither displacement nor diffusion to be a factor. The four
remaining aggravated assault WDQ’s (two negative, two positive) were small,
suggesting any displacement or diffusion effects to be minimal. WDQ’s were
negative and larger for overall violence during the 24 h and operational periods
(relative to both controls). They were well-below one, however, implying that
the level of displacement was less than the amount of crime reduced. How-
ever, for the nonoperational period, the overall violence WDQ’s of .97 (rela-
tive to the precinct) and 4.17 (relative to Zone B) suggest that more crimes
were displaced than prevented, an obviously undesirable occurrence which
previous research suggests is rare (Clarke & Eck, 2005, step. 51).
A review of the raw crime counts shows that robbery is largely responsible
for the spatial displacement. As displayed in Table 6, robbery more than dou-
bled in the catchment area (from 13 to 30) during the nonoperational period.
While other crime types also experienced increases, none were as pronounced
as robbery. Robbery also showed evidence of spatial displacement during the
operational period, with an increase of 58% (from 12 to 19) in the catchment
area. While the overall violence reduction in the target area did not dissipate
as a result, the spatial displacement of robbery negatively affected crime lev-
els in the catchment area; when robbery is removed from the crime totals,









































Overall, this study offers support for saturation foot-patrol as a violence reduc-
tion tool, with the tactic reducing overall incidents of violence as well as the
Table 4 Target area ORs for the operational and nonoperational time periods











Murder 1.06 0.06 1.67 0.08-13.33 2.00 0.69 3.50 0.05-78.25
Robbery 1.42 0.35 0.10 0.78-2.61 1.22 0.20 0.23 0.48-3.11
Aggravated
assault
2.79⁄ 1.02 0.12 1.43-5.42 2.66⁄ 0.98 0.19 1.13-6.25
Overall
violence
1.90⁄ 0.64 0.05 1.23-2.94 1.81 0.60 0.10 0.98-3.34
Shootings 3.21⁄ 1.17 0.25 1.20-8.62 2.32 0.84 0.37 0.70-7.64
Non operational
Murder 5.00 1.61 1.35 0.51-48.91 8.33 2.12 1.73 0.63-110.02
Robbery 0.79 0.23 0.12 0.40-1.58 0.72 0.33 0.22 0.29-1.80
Aggravated
assault
3.36⁄ 1.21 0.20 1.40-8.06 2.57 0.94 0.28 0.92-7.19
Overall
violence
1.50⁄ 0.41 0.06 0.93-2.42 1.29⁄ 0.26 0.10 0.70-2.38
Shootings 1.86 0.62 0.36 0.57-6.03 0.97 0.03 0.49 0.25-3.85
⁄p <.05.
Table 3 Pre-intervention/during-intervention raw crime counts in the target and
control areas by operational and nonoperational time periods
Target area Precinct control Zone B control
Pre Post % Pre Post % Pre Post %
Operational period
Murder 2 1 50 17 9 47 1 1 0
Robbery 32 21 34 123 115 7 15 12 20
Aggravated assault 39 14 64 110 110 0 22 21 5
Overall violence 73 36 50 250 234 6 38 34 11
Shootings 15 7 53 38 57 +50 12 13 +8
Non operational period
Murder 5 1 80 13 13 0 3 5 +67
Robbery 15 26 +73 93 128 +37 16 20 +25
Aggravated assault 26 7 73 115 104 10 26 18 31
Overall violence 46 34 26 221 245 +11 45 43 4
Shootings 7 6 14 32 51 +59 12 10 17







































disaggregate categories of murder, shootings, and aggravated assault. These
crimes were more effectively addressed in the target area than within either
control area, while showing no evidence of substantial spatial or temporal dis-
placement (though the effect was more pronounced when compared to the less-
rigorous precinct control area). The composition of the target area may have
been susceptible to the foot-patrol tactic. The target area has a mixture of loca-
tions conductive to both illicit and legitimate activity that can generate vio-
lence, such as drug markets (Harocopos & Hough, 2005), liquor establishments
(Block & Block, 1995; Scott & Dedel, 2006), and take out eateries with high-foot
traffic, late hours of operation, and low levels of guardianship (Kennedy, Caplan,
& Piza, 2011, p. 347). The large number of foot-patrol officers within these envi-
rons may have amounted to, what Ratcliffe et al. (2011) refer to as, a “cer-
tainty-communicating device” that alerted potential offenders to the
heightened risk of apprehension and thus provided the “certainty of punish-
ment” necessary for deterrence (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). The deterrent effect
of the heightened police presence may have been bolstered by the enforcement
activity of the unit, which likely served as a reminder of the newfound certainty
of punishment in the target area. However, while reviews of both situational
crime prevention (Barr & Pease, 1990; Eck, 1993; Guerette & Bowers, 2009; Hes-
sling, 1994) and hot-spots policing (Braga, 2008) have demonstrated displace-
ment to be far from inevitable, the robbery finding serves as a reminder that
displacement is a very real threat to prevention efforts. The exclusive displace-
ment of robbery can be explained by factors highlighted in the literature.
Nearby crime opportunities, particularly crime generators and attractors,
can provide offenders with readily accessible alternate targets for victimiza-
tion (Brantingham & Brantingham, 2003). The likelihood of displacement
decreases as the offender moves further from a familiar setting. Eck (1993)
argued that this “familiarity decay” leads to offenders knowing less about
areas outside of their normal activity nodes, explaining why geographic dis-
placement normally does not occur in response to successful prevention
Table 5 Weighted displacement quotients














Murder NA NA NA NA NA NA
Robbery NA NA NA NA NA NA
Aggravated
assault
0.05 0.167 0.00 0.03 0.11 NA
Overall
violence
0.47 0.525 0.25 NA 0.971 4.173
Shootings 0.18 NA 0.42 NA NA NA








































efforts. Weisburd et al. (2006) noted the importance of familiarity in inter-
views with prostitutes and drug offenders arrested during a place-based initia-
tive in Jersey City. When offenders were asked why they did not relocate their
operations elsewhere in response to the increased police coverage, many
responded that new areas would be unfamiliar, causing them to have to
relearn client populations, criminal competition, and police enforcement pat-
terns, which would have increased the offenders’ vulnerability. As one arrested
drug dealer offered, “. . . you really can’t deal in areas you aren’t living in, it
ain’t your turf. That’s how people get themselves killed” (p. 578).
Offender motivation has also shown to contribute to displacement, with
offenders primarily motivated by monetary gains being more likely to seek out
alternate crime targets to satisfy their needs (Guerette, Steinus, & McGloin,
2005). In their evaluation of Philadelphia’s Operation Safe Streets, Lawton,
Taylor, and Luongo (2005) found that violent crime decreased both at and in
the immediate vicinity of the targeted street corners, while the reduction of
drug crimes was slightly offset by displacement to areas surrounding the inter-
vention sites.13 Lawton et al. (2005) attributed these findings to the fact that
drug dealers are willing to relocate their operations to nearby areas that offer
continued contact with their clientele. Since violence is less planned, violent
offenders, by contrast, “probably ‘tune in’ less closely to the immediate sur-
roundings. So, for these potential offenders, simply seeing an officer on loca-
tion would lead them to generally give that locale a wide berth” (Lawton
et al., 2005, p. 448).
In respect to robbery, specific aspects of Operation Impact made it suscepti-
ble to the aforementioned displacement threats. The target area sat in a high-
crime precinct with alternate crime targets appearing nearby. Within the
catchment area, commercial corridors provided a number of vulnerable estab-
lishments and pedestrians, while housing complexes containing drug markets
provided alternate targets in the form of customers and dealers. Familiarity of
offenders was likely similar in catchment and target areas, making the sur-
13. However, the use of an alternate ARIMA model pointed to a slight diffusion of benefits effect
(Lawton et al., 2005, p. 442).




Pre Post % Pre Post % Pre Post %
Crime category
Murder 4 3 25% 1 2 100% 5 5 0%
Robbery 12 19 58% 13 30 131% 25 49 96%
Agg assault 14 14 0% 9 10 11% 23 24 4%
Total 30 36 20% 23 42 83% 53 78 47%
Shootings 9 7 22% 4 9 125% 13 16 23%







































rounding area vulnerable to spatial displacement. Furthermore, research has
shown robbers to exhibit a unique rationality that simultaneously emphasizes
immediate action and caution (Wright & Decker, 1997). Robbery was likely the
only crime to be displaced because other offenders lacked the requisite moti-
vation and situational mindset to displace their activity. It is unlikely that a
slighted bar patron, for example, would respond to a thwarted opportunity to
attack someone in front of the establishment by traveling outside of the target
area and attacking a person not involved in the quarrel.
In addition to these geographic and offender characteristics, the specific
manner by which the foot-patrol officers were deployed may have contributed
to the displacement of robbery. Sherman (1990) demonstrated the effects of
police crackdowns to be maximized when tactics are carried out in an inter-
mittent, unpredictable manner. Sherman argued that having “permanent law
enforcement priorities may make the risk of punishment too predictable for
criminals,” and that the periodic shifting of resources across several targets
could eliminate this certainty (p. 6). Operation Impact deployed a high number
of foot-patrol officers daily to a single location during a fixed time period,
which may have created a highly visible, and somewhat predictable, police
response.
While research suggests that offenders often overestimate the true coverage
of police initiatives due to the limited information at their disposal (Clarke &
Weisburd, 1994; Johnson & Payne, 1986), offenders may be able to gauge the
scope of police efforts and adjust their actions accordingly in certain cases.
Taylor et al. (2011) attributed spatial displacement in response to a hot-spots
policing effort in Jacksonville to result from the highly visible nature of the
directed patrols and the ability of offenders to recognize the areas that truly
carried an increased level of apprehension. In similar fashion, Brisgone (2004)
reported several instances where prostitutes adjusted their normal hours of
operation to avoid police patrols and crackdowns in Jersey City.
The temporal distribution of robbery incidents within the target area sug-
gests that robbers may have behaved similarly. As shown in Figure 3, robbery
spiked between the hours of 6 pm and 2 am, in the year preceding the inter-
vention. During the intervention period, robbery incidents shifted to times not
covered by the foot-patrol officers, namely the hours immediately preceding
and following the operational tour of duty. This temporal shift suggests that
offenders may have adjusted their practices by committing robberies during
times that had substantially less police coverage but offered similar opportuni-
ties as the operational time period.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The findings of this study have specific implications for law enforcement agen-
cies seeking to address violent crime hot spots. While street violence may be








































in order to avoid displacement if observed crime patterns include substantial
levels of robbery. As previously discussed, Golden and Almo (2004) found that
police officials considered a main benefit of NYPD’s Operation Impact to be
the new-found ability of precinct commanders to “free up” officers normally
deployed within the target area. The current study suggests that a more appro-
priate approach, at least in high-robbery areas of Newark, may be for police


































































































































Figure 3 Target area robberies by time of day (pre-and during-intervention periods).







































commanders to bolster the intervention by designing supplemental strategies
to complement the foot-patrol efforts instead of making the foot-patrol offi-
cers solely responsible for the target area. However, given the limited
resources at the disposal of most agencies the commitment of additional
manpower to supplement an already resource intensive intervention may not
be feasible. Instead, interventions can be designed according to Sherman’s
(1990) “crackdown-back off” recommendation where law enforcement efforts
are rotated amongst numerous hot spots. In addition, the operational times
could be fluctuated so that the “start” and “end” times of the operation var-
ied from day-to-day. Such tactics may minimize the likelihood for both tempo-
ral and spatial displacement by making potential offenders unaware of
precisely when and where they are at an increased risk of apprehension. In
addition, by leveraging residual deterrence generated by officer presence and
activity, police may be able to achieve crime reductions while minimizing time
in hot spots, a more cost-effective approach than the permanent deployment
of personnel within a single target area (Koper, 1995, p. 668).
The research methodology suffers from specific flaws that should be men-
tioned. For one, this study was unable to measure the residual effect of Opera-
tion Impact. Research has shown certain place-based interventions to produce
initial crime reductions only to have the deterrence effects fade over time
(Jang, Lee, & Hoover, in press; Mazerolle, Hurley, & Chamlin, 2002; Sherman,
1990). An attempt to measure this phenomenon was not made in this work due
to the imprecise “end date” of Operation Impact. In July of 2009, the Police
Department’s operational budget was significantly reduced, which led to offi-
cers normally assigned to Operation Impact being frequently deployed to core
patrol assignments in an attempt to minimize overtime expenditures related to
maintaining departmentally mandated levels of patrol coverage. Though pre-
cise documentation was unable to be provided, Newark Police leadership sta-
ted that Operation Impact patrols were canceled, or ran at less than full
strength, on a fairly frequent basis due to officers being temporally assigned to
other details. In 2010, the Newark Police Department phased-out Operation
Impact in preparation for impending police layoffs.14 Since the implementation
of Operation Impact was sporadic from July 2009 on, and an exact “end date”
was not identified, the measurement of residual effects may have reported
misleading results regarding program effect. A second limitation relates to the
fact that the small number of incidents in the target area compared to the
precinct control area may have contributed somewhat to the positive success
measures. Decreases in the target area may be more magnified than in the
much larger precinct, a fact that may be illustrated by the target area’s less-
ened effect when compared with the similarly sized Zone B. To review, dual
control areas were employed in order to twice test the Operation Impact strat-
14. In November 2010, 13% (167 of 1,265) of Newark Police officers were terminated due to the
city’s fiscal crisis (see Star Ledger, 2010). While the official “end date” of Operation Impact was in









































egy, once to the “business-as-usual” approach predominate in the surrounding
precinct and once to the less-intensive place-based tactics occurring in Zone
B. While this approach makes sense from a philosophical standpoint, readers
are cautioned against ignoring the potential influence of the research design.
Despite these limitations, this paper makes important contributions to the
policing literature. This study provides support for foot-patrol as a crime-pre-
vention tool, an important finding since earlier studies have predominately
found foot-patrol to reduce fear of crime without producing tangible crime
reductions. Furthermore, this study illustrates that displacement remains a
very real threat to place-based interventions. In light of these observations,
police officials should take caution to design foot-patrol operations——and
place-based operations in general——in a manner that maximizes crime reduc-
tion while simultaneously minimizing the chance for spatial and temporal dis-
placement.
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